2009考研西医综合240分之路——跨越考纲篇 kindle 电子书 免费 下载地址

《2009考研西医综合240分之路》系列丛书(包括跨越考纲篇、实战规律篇和冲刺高分篇)贯彻“两点三步法”的教学理念：寻找考点、记忆考点。步，通读辅导材料(或者教材)，领悟大纲精髓，以便心中有数。第二步，熟做真题，识破出题玄机，以便掌握命题思路。第三步，巩固练习，有的放矢地做习题和模拟，以便从容应对考试。

该套丛书以*考试大纲为蓝图，以历届真题为核心，以*教材为依托，以多年西医综合考试辅导的教师讲义为制胜点——透彻分析和总结出了83种题型，首次揭开了研究生考试出题和命题的规律，使读者做到知己知彼，百战不殆；精解了全部考试要求的知识点(“寻找考点”)，使读者有效地复习；精练但又覆盖了所有的考点。每一节的题目就是考试大纲的要求，可以节省读者宝贵的时间。在机械无聊的复习中，有趣的记忆提示(点睛点评)使读者耳目一新，轻松上阵。同时也希望能起到启发的作用，激发读者的灵感，从而发现更多、更好的记忆方法。

本书的章节结构是：【考点总表(图)——“地毯式”搜索考点】把章节的考点详细地罗列出来，使考生一目了然，而且可以“前看后查”(查漏补缺)；【细解考点——“闪电式”突击考点】应用各种图表和记忆方法对所有考点进行全面的复习辅导，精练而高效；【点睛点评】独创和精练的“记忆考点”方法和应考策略，使复习变得有趣和高效。

本书与《2009考研西医综合240分之路——实战规律篇》和《2009考研西医综合240分之路——冲刺高分篇》相互呼应，成为一体，帮助忙碌的考生迅速过关取胜，适合西医考研生和本科学生使用，也可供参加执业医师考试、专业技术资格考试(职称)人员参考。

上篇 解读西医综合考试

第1章 西医综合考试简介

第2章 西医综合考试特点

第3章 谁在“难为”我们和如何“难为”我们——谁在命题出题和如何命题出题

第4章 低分的误区和高分的秘诀

第5章 西医综合复习大法——两点三步法

第6章 西医综合复习用书、考研信息来源和免费历届真题网站

下篇 西医综合大纲细化与精解——真正的大纲

第1部分 生理学

第1章 绪论

第2章 细胞的基本功能

第3章 血液

第4章 血液循环

第5章 呼吸

第6章 消化和吸收

第7章 能量代谢和体温

第8章 肾脏的排泄

第9章 感觉器官

第10章 神经系统

第11章 内分泌

第12章 生殖

第2部分 生物化学

第1章 生物大分子的结构和功能

第2章 物质代谢

第3章 基因信息的传递

第4章 生化专题

第3部分 病理学

第1章 细胞与组织损伤

第2章 修复、代偿与适应

第3章 局部血液及体液循环障碍

第4章 炎症

第5章 肿瘤

第6章 免疫病理

第7章 心血管系统疾病

第8章 呼吸系统疾病

第9章 消化系统疾病

第10章 造血系统疾病

第11章 泌尿系统疾病

第12章 生殖系统疾病

第13章 传染病及寄生虫病

第14章 其他

第4部分 诊断学

第1章 常见症状学

第2章 体格检查

第3章 实验诊断

第4章 器械检查

第5部分 内科学

第1章 消化系统疾病和中毒

第2章 循环系统疾病

第3章 呼吸系统疾病

第4章 泌尿系统疾病

第5章 血液系统疾病

第6章 内分泌系统和代谢疾病

第7章 结缔组织病和风湿性疾病

第6部分 外科总论

第1章 外科领域的分子生物学

第2章 无菌术

第3章 体液代谢和酸碱平衡失调

第4章 输血

第5章 外科休克

第6章 多器官功能不全综合征

第7章 疼痛

第8章 围手术期处理

第9章 外科病人的营养代谢

第10章 外科感染

第11章 创伤

第12章 烧伤

第13章 肿瘤

第14章 移植

第15章 麻醉、重症监测治疗与复苏

第7部分 胸部外科疾病

第2章 肺癌

第3章 食管癌

第4章 原发性纵隔肿瘤

第8部分 普通外科

第1章 颈部疾病

第2章 乳房疾病

第3章 腹外疝

第4章 腹部损伤

第5章 急性化脓性腹膜炎

第6章 胃十二指肠疾病

第7章 小肠疾病

第8章 阑尾炎

第9章 结、直肠与肛管疾病

第10章 肝疾病

第11章 门静脉高压症

第12章 胆道疾病

第13章 上消化道大出血的鉴别诊断和处理原则

第14章 急腹症的诊断与鉴别诊断

第15章 胰腺疾病

第16章 脾切除的适应证及其疗效

第17章 动脉瘤

第18章 周围血管和淋巴管疾病

第9部分 泌尿、男性生殖系统外科疾病

第1章 总论

第2章 泌尿系统损伤

第3章 泌尿、男生殖系统结核

第4章 泌尿系统梗阻

第5章 泌尿系统肿瘤

第6章 其他疾病

第10部分 骨科

第1章 骨折与关节脱位

第2章 膝关节韧带损伤

第3章 手外伤

第4章 断肢(指)再植

第5章 周围神经损伤

第6章 运动系统慢性损伤

第7章 腰腿痛和颈肩痛

第8章 骨与关节化脓性感染

第9章 骨与关节结核

第10章 非化脓性关节炎

第11章 运动系统畸形

第12章 骨肿瘤

附录

2008年全国硕士研究生入学统一考试西医综合科目试题

2008年全国硕士研究生入学统一考试西医综合科目试题答案与精解

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书籍介绍

《2009考研西医综合240分之路•跨越考纲篇》系列（包括跨越考纲篇、实战规律篇和跨越考纲篇）丛书贯彻两点三步法的教学理念：寻找考点、记忆考点。第一步，通读辅导材料（或者教材），领悟大纲精髓，以便心中有数。第二步，熟做真题，识破出题玄机，以便掌握命题思路。第三步，巩固练习，有的放矢地做习题和模拟，以便从容应对考试。

该套丛书以最新考试大纲为蓝图，以历届真题为核心，以最新教材为依托，以多年西医综合考试辅导的老师讲义为制胜点——透彻分析和总结出了64种题型，首次揭开了研究生考试出题和命题的规律，使读者做到知己知彼，百战不殆。精解了全部考试要求的知识点（寻找考点），使读者有效地复习；精炼但又覆盖了所有的考点。每一节的题目就是考试大纲的要求，可以节省读者宝贵的时间。独创和精炼的记忆考点方法（点睛点评），使复习变得有趣和有效。在机械无聊的复习中，有趣的记忆提示使读者耳目一新，轻松上阵。同时也希望起到启发的作用，激发读者的灵感，从而发现更多、更好的记忆方法。《2009考研西医综合240分之路•跨越考纲篇》的章节结构是【考点总表（图）——地毯式搜索考点】：把章节的考点详细的罗列出来，使得考生一目了然，而且可以前看后查（结束该章节的复习后可以查漏补缺）；【细解考点——闪电式突击考点】：应用各种图表和记忆方法对所有考点进行全面的复习辅导。

《2009考研西医综合240分之路•跨越考纲篇》与《实战规律篇》和《冲刺高分篇》相互呼应，成为一体，帮助忙碌的考生迅速过关取胜。适合西医考研生和本科学生使用，也可以作为执业医师考试、专业技术资格考试（职称）参考使用。

• 作者： 小木匠 发布时间：2006-12-23 16:50:04

  高中时代

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• 作者： 老彭是個书脊党 发布时间：2020-11-05 22:26:43

  和王树增的纪实小说相比有不小的差距，不过的确是一本用于了解中国四大野战军历史的不错读物。西北野战军在物资最贫乏，地理环境最恶劣，敌人最精锐的不利条件下始终保持作战。虽然未曾参与三大战役，但整个解放战争时期起到了吸引国民党反动派胡宗南主力的关键作用，让老蒋双拳出击却骑虎难下，中门大开，才有了中野华野翻江倒海。回想彭帅，从红军，井冈山到瑞金，长征，再到八路军，一野，之后的新疆，再到朝鲜，以及最后的……一生都在和强敌作战，宁折不弯，至死方休！

• 作者： António 发布时间：2023-12-29 19:53:20

  课余时间刷完，感觉读英文论文都快了很多。

• 作者： 夏半夜凉 发布时间：2023-11-01 22:56:40

  不知道为什么会有高分推介。真就是报流水账的小说

• 作者： BLuwT 发布时间：2023-07-21 10:19:47

  想起了老爸早晚辛辛苦苦的在庄稼地里拔草，但草一直长不完，原来是因为拔草的时间不对，应该在中午铲出来，暴晒于阳光下，这样杂草就死了。而用草甘膦则在黎明时喷洒效果最佳

• Reversed Horwitz Thesis? Patent Grants from 16th Century England to Early 19th Century America

  作者：浩水行舟 发布时间：2013-03-30 06:20:55

  “Legal historians and theorists are in nearly complete agreement that the non-instrumental views of the common law . . . held sway through the eighteenth century. They agree also that the instrumental view of law took hold in the course of the twentieth century.” This, however, leaves questions with regard to the nineteenth century unanswered. In his pioneer work, The Transformation of American Law (1977), Morton Horwitz provides an account that “legal instrumentalism flowered in the United States in the first quarter of the nineteenth century and lasted until the mid-nineteenth century, when it was supplanted by a lengthy non-instrumental period running from the Civil War until after the turn of the century.” According to Horwitz, “[i]n eighteenth century America . . . the common law was conceived of as a body of essentially fixed doctrine to be applied in order to achieve a fair result between private litigants in individual cases.” However, after the Revolution, judges adopted a consciously instrumental view of law to shape the common law in a manner friendly to economic development. “What dramatically distinguished nineteenth century law from its eighteenth century counterpart,” Horwitz wrote, “was the extent to which common law judges came to play a central role in directing the course of social change.”

   

  This Article tests the “Horwitz thesis”—the emergence of instrumental views of law in early 19th century America—in the area of patent law. Patent law is chosen as the prism for obvious reasons. One the one hand, patent law has deep common law roots: “industrial monopoly licenses” have existed in England since 1561, and the common law courts in England have been adjudicating disputes concerning these monopoly licenses since as early as 1602. On the other hand, the predominantly agrarian America in early 19th century had great incentives to “instrumentalize” patent law to promote manufactures for economic competition and military supplies. If “Horwitz thesis” were correct, the early years in 19th century would have witnessed a shift of focus of patent law from fairness to economic development. Paradoxically history witnessed a shift in almost exactly the opposite direction. Canvassing both secondary and primary historical sources (including statutes, court opinions and political and legal treatises), this Article provides an account of the “reversed Horwitz thesis” in the area of patent law: the instrumental nature of patent grants in English common law was eclipsed by the “imagined past” when patent law unfolded in the early 19th century America; instead patent rights were, at least to some extent, justified in American courts by the natural rights philosophy. What distinguished 19th century patent law from its 18th century counterpart was not judges’ willingness to direct the course of social change, but judges’ apparent lack of such willingness.

   

  Patent Grants in 16th to 18th Century England

  The earliest known instances of industrial monopolies in Europe were found in Venice about the year 1500. From Italy they were introduced into the Netherlands, and from thence to England. The English patent custom took root and flourished during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I. William Searle Holdsworth portrays the essence of the grants of industrial monopoly licenses in England as “in return for the introduction of a manufacturing process, formerly unknown in this country, the introducer was granted [by Crown] a monopoly of using that process for a specified length of time.” “The aim was to introduce into [England] those industries the products of which had hitherto figured most prominently on the lists of imports.” Because the Crown often expected the grantee to not only introduce but also establish the industry in England, “there are often clauses aimed at binding the grantee to introduce his process within a fixed period, to employ and teach English subjects, and sometimes to manufacture a certain minimum quantity within a given period.”

  The second half of 16th century witnessed the trajectory of the system of monopolies, designed originally to foster new arts, degrading into a system of plunder in the hands of the corrupt courtiers, who sought to secure lucrative licensing patents in old industries. The 1623 Statute of Monopolies was enacted at the culmination point of a long struggle between Parliament and the Crown to place curbs on the royal prerogative. While declaring all monopolies contrary to the law of this realm and therefore void, the Statute explicitly made an exception for patent monopolies, and thereafter became the hallmark of English patent law—remarkably till this day. Section V of the Statute provides:

  “Provided alsoe That any Declaracion before mencioned shall not extend to any tres Patents and Graunt of Privilege for the tearme of fowerteene yeares or under, hereafter to be made of the sole working or makinge of any manner of new Manufactures within this Realme, to the true and first Inventor and Inventors of such Manufactures, which others at the tyme of makinge such tres Patents and Graunts shall not use, soe as alsoe they be not contrary to the Lawe nor mischievous to the State, by raisinge prices of Commodities at home, or hurt of Trade, or generallie inconvenient; the said fourteene yeares to be [accomplished] from the date of the first tres Patents or Grant of such priviledge hereafter to be made, but that the same shall be of such force as they should be if this Act had never byn made, and of none other.”

  In seeking to ascertain the meaning of this Section, it must be remembered that its language has to be examined in the context of its times. The particular fact that a major participant in the development of the law relating to monopolies in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, Lord Coke, happened to sit on the influential Clothworkers of Ipswich Case decided in 1615, makes it all the more likely that the spirit of the Statute of Monopolies is consistent with the preceding judicial opinions.

     

  In The Clothworkers of Ipswich, the grantees of a Crown monopoly to run tailor businesses in the town of Ipswich brought suit against the defendant for violation. In striking down the royal grant as unlawful, the King’s Bench conceded that the king might make corporations and that these corporations may make ordinances for any trade, but decided the case at issue on that the corporations “cannot make a monopoly, for that is to take away free trade, which is the birthright of every subject.” Immediately the King’s Bench made a caveat to its disapproval of monopoly:

  “[b]ut if a man hath brought in a new invention and a new trade within the kingdom, in peril of his life, and consumption of his estate and stock, etc., or if a man hath made a new discovery of anything, in such case the king, of his grace and favor, in recompense of his costs and travail, may grant by charter unto him, that he only shall use such a trade or traffic for a certain time, because at first the people of kingdom are ignorant, and have not the knowledge or skill to use it; but when the patent is expired, the king cannot make a new grant thereof, for when the trade has become common, and others have been bound apprentices in the same trade, there is no reason why such should be forbidden to use it.”

      

  In light of the contemporary judicial interpretation and the political climate at its time, the meaning of the language of the Statute of Monopolies starts to become clear. “True and first inventor” encompasses both individuals bringing a new invention “within the kingdom” and individuals making “a new discovery of anything”, and is plausibly intended to prevent courtiers from getting patent licenses on old industries. This broad definition of “inventor” was confirmed in later cases such as Edgeberry v. Stephens (K.B. 1691). At the same time, “patents and grant of privilege” are entirely up to the King’s “grace and favor.” An inventor has no inherent property right in his invention. Instead, a king can choose to grant an inventor a charter to recompense him for his costs and toil, with the expectation that the inventor will educate the king’s subjects of his invention. Thus at the time of the Statute of Monopolies’ passage in the early 17th century, a patent was conceptualized as a contract between the Crown and the patentee, which eventually morphed into a social contract between the patentee and society at the end of 18th century.

     

  In sum, from its genesis in 16th century, the English patent law had two prominent features that last till the eve of the American Revolution. First, monopoly grants in England originated as a means to attract craftsmen possessing superior continental technology. What today will be called “technological piracy” from foreign countries was the very motive behind the Crown’s granting of patents, and the granting of so-called “importation patents” continued well into 19th century. Second, monopoly patents originated as a type of royal prerogatives. The granting of a patent was conceptualized in a contractual way, and an inventor never had inalienable natural rights in his invention. As the next section will make clear, both of these features of English patent law were at odds with the American practice and thinking of patent law in early 19th century. It is worth noting here, however, that in the two centuries that common law courts had been involved in adjudicating private patent litigations before the first American patent act, the common law judges had not lost sight of the patent system’s birthmark as an instrument for the Crown to stimulate domestic economic development, and had strived to balance the limited monopolies against public interests. In contrast to the conventional wisdom about 18th century common law, patent law in 18th century England was fundamentally instrumental in nature, which was curiously obscured in the early 19th century American public discourse.

  IP Clause and American Patent Law in Early 19th Century

  Although a patent custom paralleling with that in England existed in the American colonies (albeit on a much more sporadic and less uniform scale), the origin of American patent system was often attributed to the federal convention of 1787, when the Framers came to propose that Congress be authorized “To promote the Progress of Science of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Regrettably, little was known about how the inclusion of the to-be-called intellectual property clause came about. The adoption of this clause was without dissent and without debate. The absence of any discussion on the meanings of the terms “inventors” and “discoveries” could have been construed as acquiescence to their default meanings in common law lexicon. Nevertheless, these terms would quickly be viewed in a restrictive light by Congress and the courts. As a result, the United States would become the first country with a patent system to preclude the issuance of patents of importation.

   

  The prohibition on patents of importation could be traced to the first Federal Congress, who authored the Patent Act of 1790. As the patent bill, H.R. 41 was introduced, it contained a section expressly stating that “the first importer of any art, machine, engine, device or invention, or any improvement thereon should be treated as if he or she were the original inventor or improver within the United States.” However, this language would not survive the subsequent debate in the House and the Senate, and was deleted from the 1790 Patent Act. Although patents of importation were not explicitly excluded from the 1790 Patent Act, the next few decades would witness the judiciary making this point emphatically. In the earliest reported United States patent case, Reutgen v. Kanowrs in 1804, Justice Washington thus charged jury: “if the invention was brought over, that is, if it appears that the plaintiff was not the original inventor, in reference to other parts of the world as well as America, he is not entitled to a patent.” In 1812 in Livingston v. Van Ingen, Chief Justice Kent held that the power to grant patents to encourage imported improvements resided not in the Congress but in the states. Finally, the most influential jurist of the early nineteenth century, Justice Joseph Story, excluded importation patents not just from the subject matter of patent act but from that of the intellectual property clause in the Constitution: “The Power, in its terms, is confined to authors and inventors; and cannot be extended to the introducers of any new works or inventions.”

   

  It is only natural that one would be astonished by this conscious divergence from the settled English law. After all, the second half of 18th century saw a tremendous upsurge in the number of patents issues in England, which correlated well with the industrial revolution. Patents could be easily perceived by the 19th century American legal elites as playing an important role in the industrial development in England. Moreover, the desirability of transferring European manufacturing technology to the United States was well recognized by the Washington Administration. In his Report on the Subject of Manufactures in 1791, the Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton set forth eleven particular means for supporting manufactures, the eighth being “The encouragement of new inventions and discoveries at home, and of the introduction into the United States of such as may have been made in other countries; particularly those which relate to machinery.” How quickly the world turned around for those seeking patent licenses on imported inventions from the United States government. But why?

  Walterscheid suggested that James Madison played a key role in the first Congress’ deletion of any mention of importation patents from the 1790 Patent Act. Providing no supporting rationale, Walterscheid claimed, Madison acknowledged in one of his letters his view that patents of importation were unconstitutional, a view apparently shared by Alexander Hamilton, who also failed to spelled out his reason. The absence of reasoning on the constitutionality of importation patents is dubious, especially in face of the tremendous and apparent economic benefit that importing technologies from Europe would bestow on the young United States. The question still remains what in the early legal elites’ psyche prevented them from adopting a pragmatic and instrumental view of patent law—indeed the long settled view in England.

  Adam Mossoff’s account of why how patent rights were defined and enforced using the labor theory of property of natural rights philosophy in early 19th century America might shed some light on the present question. According to Mossoff’s account, the key to understand the Founders’ understanding of the intellectual property clause is The Federalist No. 43, the only official, public document in which a Founder expressly discussed patents: “The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors.” This brief remark seems to be justifying patent rights on the equal footing with copyright rights, which was known by the late 18th century, in the words of Blackstone, as “a special species of property” “grounded on labor and invention.” Because the inventors have property rights in what they acquired by intellectual laboring, importers of technologies should of course be excluded from patent grants despite the social exigencies for imported manufactures.

  In sum, the early 19th century American patent law diverged sharply from both the settled English patent practice and thinking. The instrumental nature of the English patent law was eclipsed by the rise of American natural rights thinking about patent law, and as a logical consequence the imported inventions were rejected patent rights in early 19th century American courts. What could be observed in the area of patent law, therefore, at the turn of 19th century, was a move in the reversed direction of what Horwitz thesis predicts: judges in 19th century became less willing than in previous ages to use law as an instrument for social change. To fully disentangle this mystery is beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, this Article proposes one possible explanation: that an imagined and romanticized past disillusioned the 19th century legal elites, so that they misconceived the instrumental underpinnings of the common law to be more lofty than they in reality were. Interestingly, the very type of romanticization still permeates the contemporary conception of the common law history and prompts vigorous debates. The very existence of Horwitz thesis is a testimony thereto.

• 不朽的英雄，不朽的故事

  作者：BACK 发布时间：2018-05-09 21:59:50